UNMIN's Reintegration Plan is Under Fire in Nepal

Krishna Hari Pushkar

The United Nation Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)'s has imported and now introduced a sixty weeks reintegration plan for ex-Maoist Combatants in Nepal. It has come in a crucial strategic period and political transition period of Nepal. The UNMIN is being accused that it has been working against its mandate and favoring particular political powers and ideologies. Often, UNMIN tries to intervene in domestic political affairs, which crosses its limitation. In the past, the chief of UNMIN was about to be declared Persona non grata. Today, Nepal has just a caretaker government and is suffering from political limbo. As many of us know, the ongoing political escapades in Nepal are not favorable for an effective and successful implementation of a comprehensive peace process and related plans.

The "Reintegration Plan" of the UNMIN has come as a nasty surprise for domestic peace stakeholders, because the plan was supposed to come after political consensus and proper homework - respecting the aspirations and needs of the nation. It did not, however, come in the right time, right manner, right way and by the right authority. It is nothing special, just a way to please donors in the community; to allow the UN General Secretary to be safe; and to sustain both his job and the life of UNMIN in Nepal. It is an open secret to all that the ill-fated plan cannot work for reintegration.

Naturally, the plan has come under serious dispute and has been straightforwardly rejected by the head of the Government and its coalition parties, which should be regarded as a major fault of the plan. On the one hand, the Prime Minister Mr. Nepal has already threatened UNMIN against its so-called reintegration plan and on the other hand the Maoist has also expressed its strategic discrepancy by developing its own party's reintegration plan. On the other side, the ex Maoist combatants and other stakeholders including civil societies, private communities and general citizens are also not happy with the plan. Its simple--no one is happy except the employees and allies of UNMIN.

There are lots of problems with the plan. First, it sounds like its prepared in an academic manner, ignoring the sensitivity of local socioeconomic and political scenario. It seems the plan is designed and developed by those experts who are aware about the literature and story but not about the facts, local context and relevant contents of Nepal.

Secondly, it has no participatory planning characters that are must for any reintegration plan. Third, it has neither sustainability measures about the plan nor is it owned by government or the particular authority e.g. state/executive or parliamentary committees, civil society, local government or any authorities that are directly supported and authorized by the government. It is because the government is the only authority who has ultimate and final accountability to manage and deal with pre to post phases of reintegration and to entire processes with its citizens. It is not just a matter of peace and politics--it has to do with national and internal laws too. Furthermore, it is also true that the UNMIN has not worked properly in profiling and opportunity mapping areas that are a must for any successful reintegration plan. Thus, the locals in Nepal consider the aired reintegration plan as an authoritative/interventional course of action.

In my observation, UNMIN and respective outsiders should pay more attention and need to be careful about its given mandate and legitimized role. They should understand "reintegration" is not like distributing food packets or organizing seminar projects. The reintegration is related to the past and the long term future of the nation’s people, as well as its peace, polity, and governance related affairs.

It has broader areas and scope, which has a lot to do with political consensus and agreements. So, they must attempt to work on a pre-policy impact assessment approach and must use the conflict sensitivity analysis while working on such crucial plans, policies, programs and projects in such a conflict-affected fragile country like Nepal, which is a among the poorest countries of the world. It is on the one hand a post-conflict nation and on the other hand it has severe ongoing arm ethno-regional-political insurgencies in various parts of Nepal. The reintegration plan has direct relations and links with other ongoing insurgency groups and its insurgents' arm group, so it need be clarified before to introduce such policy and plan. Though, UNMIN has not yet presented any strategy to address the issue in their so called advertised disabled reintegration plan, which is unfortunate one. UNMIN must know that any reintegration plan should not undermine the contemporary sociopolitical situation or the sustainability of its long term management while introducing the reintegration plan.

Sadly, the UNMIN has failed to recognize even the existing and potential actors of reintegration. The UNMIN deliberately failed to consider the importance of, or to coordinate with the various stakeholders in different layers. Therefore, the UNMIN must correct its roles and activities regarding the reintegration of ex combatants in Nepal, otherwise, such plans could add more political tension and confusion over the peace process in an upcoming day in Nepal. The poorly designed reintegration plan may push the nation into further conflict and political polarization. It could stymie the entire ongoing peace process. Of course it would be vexing to bring the peace process into its logical end.

Any plan from the UNMIN that may assist the mismanagement of ex combatants and their future should not come into the nation. The UNMIN has no rights or authority to play with the future of the nation and its citizens. The time will come soon where the state will get stronger, and will be compelled to take action against the UNMIN--and declare their officials Persona non gratae, if they continue such activities in the upcoming days.

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Reintegration of Former Combatants

Ministry of Labour Needs To Be Involved in Reintegration of Former Combatants

By Krishna Hari Pushkar

The reintegration issue of ex-Maoist combatants has become one of the most confrontational issues of the ongoing Nepal peace process.

The ongoing Nepalese Peace Process (PP) has been virtually shelved. The basic deadline for constitution building has been ended with no result. The Peace Process is simply being destroyed due to the consensual derivatives between the Maoists and Nepal Government on reintegration issues.

Both parties have agreed to integrate the former Maoist guerrillas into the Nepalese security system but have always been undecided about the number of guerrillas. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is supposed to provide technical support in the peace process; however the role of UNMIN has not been very useful in this regard.

Surprisingly, the Internal and external stakeholders of the Nepalese Peace Process have remained silent on the turmoil. For this reason, the bilateral-multilateral confrontation on reintegration affairs has become one of the major hurdles in achieving sustainable peace through an agreed-upon comprehensive peace accord.

Both parties are sticking to the stance to forcefully push the ex-combatants into security forces ignoring the choice, voice and rights of the ex-Maoist guerrillas. Despite the huge scope, and the role and sources of the ministry, it is being completely undermined by so called peace leaders and their teams handling the issues.

According to the Government of Nepal's Work Division Regulation 2064, the Ministry of Labour and Transport Management has important and relevant responsibilities that include internal and external labour and employment affairs, social safety nets and security, vocational trainings, HRD/man power development and etc. Thus the assigned responsibilities and authority of the Ministry could be incredibly helpful to manage or reintegrate thousands of intended people or ex-Maoist combatants through direct/indirect, internal and external mechanisms of the ministry.

Frankly, the ministry is quite able to provide opportunities for internal and external employment, skill oriented vocational trainings, and many other courses and opportunities for reintegration and rehabilitation of former guerrillas.

Although, the role and potential resources of the Ministry has been forgotten while discussing the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-combatants; it has been never been discussed or put forward by the Ministry itself/ the government nor by the Maoist party.

According to a survey report, the majority of cantonment-based Maoist guerrillas are considering their choices to go for other alternatives rather to enter into army. Also, both parties have realized that accommodating all (approximately 19,000) former guerrillas in the army is not possible, they all are still insisting and only sticking with employing them in the army sector.

It is not just a matter of realization of facts but also beyond the national need and capacity. It has been also observed that there are hundreds of ex-Maoist combatants who are not eligible (old, children, disabled, ill-sick etc.) to meet the minimum eligibility and condition to enter in national security system, so again, there are good alternatives to assigning the job to the labour ministry.

The top brass of government, ruling political parties, Maoists, and the technical committee, have all stopped moving forward on reintegration issues--including the previously constituted high-level political mechanism (HLPM).

Still dismissing the truth, both conflicting parties are digging ways either to integrate them into the army or in other national security systems leaving the other better options of rehabilitation and reintegration through the Ministry of Labour.

In accordance with eligibility and the rights, voices and choices of the former Maoist Guerrillas, the Ministry may create many options and modules of reintegration and rehabilitation, such as:

A. Choices to go in foreign employment in more than one hundred thirty destinations, under more than two hundred varieties of technical and non technical jobs.

B. Choices to settle into domestic employment. The ministry can easily help to develop preferential employment packages for the ex-combatants by developing strategic policy, programs and functional coordination of industrialists, private sector and trade union institutions.

C. The Ministry has capabilities to provide skill based short-term and long-term vocational trainings on a need basis that may help ex-combatants, whether they choose domestic and international jobs or prefer self-employment.

D. The ministry has enriched funding capabilities for pre to post employment phases and can introduce chain welfare investments for the potential candidates among the ex-combatant Maoist guerrillas.

E. In addition, the ministry have many contingency possibilities to rehabilitate ex-Maoist combatants through social safety net programs and also could include them into jobs such as in the transport management sector. However the government as well other related stakeholders must be careful to consider the integrated community-based reintegration approach rather than the ex-combatant based targeted approach of reintegration. The worlds experience has proved that most DDR programs have failed because the community and relevant stakeholders were ignored in pre to post phases of the entire process.

Therefore, the Ministry could be a principle means to deal and resolve the ongoing dilemmas of the peace process on the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-Maoist combatants since it has a strong, and broader nationwide network and many collaborations with the respective community as well as to the stakeholders. Sometimes, it is judicious to resolve the problem from outside the horizon, especially if the given framework is unable to resolve the problem or adding more and more difficulties in the name of searching for solutions within a limited framework.

Furthermore, it has been observed through a survey report that they will be happier to jump inside the explored options of the Ministry. The illustrated options are financially, technically and legally viable and can also be quickly implemented to address the reintegration and rehabilitation crisis of cantonment-based guerillas, as well as for those deviated combatants who are running in search of socioeconomic reintegration and rehabilitation.

Except for the Maoist party, most of the stakeholders in the peace process want to minimize the number as much as possible of ex-combatants to integrate into the Nepal Army or any other national security system. Because the existing Maoist guerrillas neither meet any professional standard and norms of "State Security" nor is this possible after the merger as international factors and recognition are important for the state security system.

Secondly, Maoist Guerrillas are obvious political extremists, biased and infected with extreme Maoism and prachnadpath, and naturally deviate towards a specific political ideology of its party. Thirdly, similar questions might emerge when another existing insurgent group asks for a similar type of reintegration.

There are more than two dozen other rebellion groups who have also been fighting against the State in various parts of Nepal. It is my observation that the political reintegration model of the Nepalese peace process (accepting Maoists as lawmakers, giving enough places in parliament and directly appointing them into various senior policy level posts in the name of political integration) has become one of the major motivational factors for existing ethno-regional insurgent groups who have started fighting with a hope that they will also get chances to be member of parliaments or some other appointment while they enter in the peace process like the Maoist rebellion.

Of course, the nature and composition of existing insurgent groups are also similar to Maoist guerrillas, and some would say a majority are the splinter groups of Maoists--so what do we do in the future if such things are repeated? Other rebels could also ask for a similar model of political reintegration and also mass entry into the state security system as Maoists are claiming now, so can we really afford it?

Lastly, the existing performances and activities of Maoist guerrillas are still in a rebellious line; they are not even trying to stay in normality nor do they believe in peaceful political democratic philosophy, even after entering in the peace process under the supervision of UNMIN. Therefore it is difficult to stick on a path that pushes entire reintegration with the whole country in chaos.

Therefore, it is clever for all peace process stakeholders to explore the Ministry of Labour and Transport Management as efficient options/alternatives for the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of Ex-Maoist Combatants. This option will bring plenty of benefits including resolving the political deadlock, and will be helpful to drive the entire peace process to its logical end, assisting to harmonize and socialize the ex-combatants in strategic manner.

One of the principle products of the approach is to help and restore the constitution building process in a timely and efficient manner. Additionally, this approach will also minimize the general and technical complexities of reintegration and rehabilitation of cantonment-based guerillas.

Of course, the described way, via the ministry, will increase and add additional value on the success of the ongoing process, and its productivity towards the similar concept and manner of DDR, SSR and RRR (which are crucial and indispensable in a post conflict scenario). Hence, the Ministry must be given the chance for active involvement while dealing with the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-Maoist combatants.

It is a better way to achieve sustainable peace, security and harmony in the country and will mobilize and utilize the existing official sector, resources and approaches of the nation.

Mr. Krishnahari Pushkar writes about social issues, security and conflict management, often in relation to Nepal. An Under Secretary of Government in Nepal, he is well-honored as a Peace, Security and Conflict Management Professional, who contributes regularly to national and international nongovernmental organizations as a peace and conflict management expert.

Source: http://newsblaze.com/story/20100623135945abha.nb/topstory.html