UNMIN's Reintegration Plan is Under Fire in Nepal

Krishna Hari Pushkar

The United Nation Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)'s has imported and now introduced a sixty weeks reintegration plan for ex-Maoist Combatants in Nepal. It has come in a crucial strategic period and political transition period of Nepal. The UNMIN is being accused that it has been working against its mandate and favoring particular political powers and ideologies. Often, UNMIN tries to intervene in domestic political affairs, which crosses its limitation. In the past, the chief of UNMIN was about to be declared Persona non grata. Today, Nepal has just a caretaker government and is suffering from political limbo. As many of us know, the ongoing political escapades in Nepal are not favorable for an effective and successful implementation of a comprehensive peace process and related plans.

The "Reintegration Plan" of the UNMIN has come as a nasty surprise for domestic peace stakeholders, because the plan was supposed to come after political consensus and proper homework - respecting the aspirations and needs of the nation. It did not, however, come in the right time, right manner, right way and by the right authority. It is nothing special, just a way to please donors in the community; to allow the UN General Secretary to be safe; and to sustain both his job and the life of UNMIN in Nepal. It is an open secret to all that the ill-fated plan cannot work for reintegration.

Naturally, the plan has come under serious dispute and has been straightforwardly rejected by the head of the Government and its coalition parties, which should be regarded as a major fault of the plan. On the one hand, the Prime Minister Mr. Nepal has already threatened UNMIN against its so-called reintegration plan and on the other hand the Maoist has also expressed its strategic discrepancy by developing its own party's reintegration plan. On the other side, the ex Maoist combatants and other stakeholders including civil societies, private communities and general citizens are also not happy with the plan. Its simple--no one is happy except the employees and allies of UNMIN.

There are lots of problems with the plan. First, it sounds like its prepared in an academic manner, ignoring the sensitivity of local socioeconomic and political scenario. It seems the plan is designed and developed by those experts who are aware about the literature and story but not about the facts, local context and relevant contents of Nepal.

Secondly, it has no participatory planning characters that are must for any reintegration plan. Third, it has neither sustainability measures about the plan nor is it owned by government or the particular authority e.g. state/executive or parliamentary committees, civil society, local government or any authorities that are directly supported and authorized by the government. It is because the government is the only authority who has ultimate and final accountability to manage and deal with pre to post phases of reintegration and to entire processes with its citizens. It is not just a matter of peace and politics--it has to do with national and internal laws too. Furthermore, it is also true that the UNMIN has not worked properly in profiling and opportunity mapping areas that are a must for any successful reintegration plan. Thus, the locals in Nepal consider the aired reintegration plan as an authoritative/interventional course of action.

In my observation, UNMIN and respective outsiders should pay more attention and need to be careful about its given mandate and legitimized role. They should understand "reintegration" is not like distributing food packets or organizing seminar projects. The reintegration is related to the past and the long term future of the nation’s people, as well as its peace, polity, and governance related affairs.

It has broader areas and scope, which has a lot to do with political consensus and agreements. So, they must attempt to work on a pre-policy impact assessment approach and must use the conflict sensitivity analysis while working on such crucial plans, policies, programs and projects in such a conflict-affected fragile country like Nepal, which is a among the poorest countries of the world. It is on the one hand a post-conflict nation and on the other hand it has severe ongoing arm ethno-regional-political insurgencies in various parts of Nepal. The reintegration plan has direct relations and links with other ongoing insurgency groups and its insurgents' arm group, so it need be clarified before to introduce such policy and plan. Though, UNMIN has not yet presented any strategy to address the issue in their so called advertised disabled reintegration plan, which is unfortunate one. UNMIN must know that any reintegration plan should not undermine the contemporary sociopolitical situation or the sustainability of its long term management while introducing the reintegration plan.

Sadly, the UNMIN has failed to recognize even the existing and potential actors of reintegration. The UNMIN deliberately failed to consider the importance of, or to coordinate with the various stakeholders in different layers. Therefore, the UNMIN must correct its roles and activities regarding the reintegration of ex combatants in Nepal, otherwise, such plans could add more political tension and confusion over the peace process in an upcoming day in Nepal. The poorly designed reintegration plan may push the nation into further conflict and political polarization. It could stymie the entire ongoing peace process. Of course it would be vexing to bring the peace process into its logical end.

Any plan from the UNMIN that may assist the mismanagement of ex combatants and their future should not come into the nation. The UNMIN has no rights or authority to play with the future of the nation and its citizens. The time will come soon where the state will get stronger, and will be compelled to take action against the UNMIN--and declare their officials Persona non gratae, if they continue such activities in the upcoming days.

Source

Government in Nepal: Consensual Vs Majority Party?

By Krishna Hari Pushkar

The Nepal peace process is in Limbo. On the one hand the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal has been accepted by President Ram Baran Yadav on Wednesday 30 June.

I am not sure if it is just a part of the agreement dated May 28 where Nepal's major three parties had arrived at a Three Point Agreement: (1) To bring a logical end to the peace process and accomplish the historical goal of drafting the New Constitution, we hereby commit ourselves to accomplish our duties in consensus and unity. (2) We agree to extend the tenure of the current Constituent Assembly by a one year period to accomplish the remaining tasks of drafting the constitution. (3) To accomplish the above-mentioned jobs and responsibilities we agree to form a National Unity government in consensus and assure that the prime minister of the current coalition government is ready to tender his resignation prior to extending the Constituent Assembly tenure by 12 more months.

Most of the nonpoliticians are agreed that the resignation was a necessary part of the internal pressures where the CPM - UML party and its leaders had put huge pressures on primeminister Mr. Nepal to resign immediately--he was also facing open humiliation from his own political kith and kin. Of course, there were huge pressures from the Maoist Party too but it was not as effective since he did not even resign while the Maoists called general strikes and with many other stronger democratic and non democratic pressures (including the halt of the protest in the parliament, etc). It is very sad to illustrate that the Mr. Nepal-led coalition government was under trouble all the time due to the opposition of the Maoists, so the Government was unable to perform their routine duties and responsibilities properly. Besides there have been little but productive achievements in the ongoing peace process of Nepal in work related to DDR.

The constitution building process could have been completed in due time but it did not happen due to the noncooperation of the Maoist's and their continuous massive opposition and protests.

Honestly, the Maoists party did not even recognize the Mr. Nepal-led government, so they did not want to be cooperative in any level or with anything having to do with the Government (besides the frequent asking of the quick resignation of Mr. Nepal). The most important issue was that the Mr. Nepal-led government was constituted in support of 24 parties of Nepal, and apx 22 were supported until last. The PM suntil has tge majority in the parliament but he had to resign anyway. This may be considered one of the most destructive demerits of the transitional democratic practices.

Indeed, the letter and spirit of the Interim Constitution of Nepal and the Comprehensive Peace Accord of Nepal encourages the multi-party consensual government.

The Interim Constitution and the Comprehensive Peace Accord of Nepal stress that the national consensual government is a precondition to bring about the ongoing peace process to a logical end and to complete the constitution building process in due time. However, very few of the political parties are actually serious about either of these issues.

They have started to practice an approach which has become deeply unfortunate for Nepal. Now there is a race between the parties who all want to lead the work under their own primeministership (which is not feasible at any cost because the country has only a one prime minister constitutional system). In order for the work to be don, Nepal would need at least 24 prime ministers--otherwise they will not be able to come to a consensus!

Because of the forced resignation of the Mr. Nepal-led multiparty government, there is now chaos and several disturbing confrontations to decide who will be the next prime minister of Nepal.

There are three major parties that will most likely play a crucial role to decide upon the upcoming government. The biggest one is the Maoist party; they have two candidates for Prime Minister (Mr. Pusp Kamal Dahal and Dr. Baburam Bhattrai), however there seems to be no common consensus or actual support of these particular candidates.

Similarly, the Nepalese Congressional parties have two major candidates (Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuwa and Ram Chandra Poudel) but they also have a similar situation to the Maoist candidates.

The next candidate in line is CPN-UML, whose Prime Minister Mr. Nepal was just forced to resign, and now the president Mr. Jhalnath Khanal wants to claim this primeministership--but his candidacy is not accepted by either internal and external powers.

Also, a small party Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Loktantrik, whose president Mr. Gachhedar, is also raising strong voices for his candidacy in primeministership.

India, China, and America have an especially strong influence and strategic power in terms of constituting this new government, so it won't enough to get just domestic support, but particular parties and candidates will also seek strong support from the above-mentioned international community.

In preliminary observation, there is a little hope for the Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattrai, because in order to win, he must gain anonymous support from its party, which is not an easy job because his party's president Mr. Prachand has a strong grip in his party's central to local command. On the other hand his party president has already announced his own official candidacy for primeministership.

According to the media reports and informal sources both Mr. Bhattrai and Mr. Prachanda do not have a harmonious relationship with each other and also have been found to differ in working and understanding the policies of Maoism. There is a serious rivalry that has existed for a long time between both candidates. Secondly, other parties won't support any Maoist leader for primeministership until they complete their previous commitments and agreements regarding reintegration of ex Maoist combatants, dissolution of the Young Communist League, free and fair return of seized and captured public and private properties to their original owners, honest and unconditionally obeying the comprehensive peace agreements and its related policies and practices. These have emerged as the biggest challenges facing the Maoist leader.

Concerning Prachanda, he also has similar difficulties like Bhattrai has. In addition to this, India and America have become strong opponents against him. According to media reports, India believes he supports and bears strong allies with Indian Maoist insurgency groups where hundreds of people have died during the ongoing bloodshed guerrilla warfare in many parts of India. There are many that believe Prachada's party has been supporting and helping to build an insurgency strategy, including protecting and training Indian insurgents and supply logistics etc. However, it has yet to be proven since the Government of India has not yet been able to present any proof for such allies for now. So in the meantime, Indian forces use all possible efforts to pull the Maoists from power.

Concerning America, now India and America have strong and similar ties on contemporary politics of Nepal. Suntil Maoists are on a list of suspected terrorists in the United States, and Maoists play a very different card with regard to Tibet against the interests of the US, and the US believes Maoists are in favor of Chinese strategies that are not attractive at all to the US.

Although Maoists have gained favorable supports from Scandinavia and mild support from other Schengen countries (but UK has similar interests to the US). China is also a strong power but they have a vested interest in promoting communism in Nepal but have not openly promoted any particular communist parties of Nepal. China is found mild in domestic intervention in comparison to India.

There is also a crisis of trust over the Maoists. Most of the Nepalese political parties and international community accuse Maoists as always being ready to building and make all kinds of consensus and agreements but they never put them into practice, intentionally failing in implementation. Manipulation seems to have become their manner.

Despite the illustrated facts and arguments, it is clear that the ongoing peace process and constitution building tasks cannot be performed properly without meaningful participation and contribution of the Maoists. So, they must be cooperative and should be a major pillar of government as well as part of the constitution assembly. Also, there is a sturdy voice from the Maoist party that for them, a logical end of the peace process and constitution building will not be possible until they get primeministership. So, it is a really difficult situation for Nepal.

Concerning the candidacy of Mr. Poudel and Mr. Deuwa for prime minister, the party has been suffering with highly infected groupism, with no common consensus of its candidacy. There is a massive mutual disagreement against each other inside the central command of party. Besides, Maoist leaders as well as the UML is not ready to support and participate in the Government under a Congress Party's primeministership since both the leader's personalities and their working styles are believed to be not good enough or capable to lead the party and the nation too. Although, Mr. Poudel has a back up from India and Europe, and Mr. Deuwa has a good back up from America, the UK and also a soft corner from China side. In addition, small parties like the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum are also raising its candidacy but it neither has clear support from big parties nor from the international community.

In Nepal, generally people and nationalist politicians are in opposition to any alternatives that again provide possibilities of majoritian government. Now everyone is clear that the majoritian government is not capable of achieving the national motto and goal of peace and constitution building. People have experienced past practices where Majority government was unable to deliver even the minimum level of peace and constitution.

So, the people will be extremely unhappy to see the "old win in a new bottle". People have warned the politicians and parties that they can do whatever they want, but they need both sustainable peace and an efficient homegrown constitution in due time. In the meantime, both expectations are not possible until all political parties come to the common platform and constitute national consensus government with single voices about the successful execution of the comprehensive peace accord and constitution building.

Thus, to address the above described ongoing dilemmas, the Nepalese political parties need to design its strategy in different ways than previously. There was a past experience where major Nepalese political parties agreed to accept the guidance and command of the government and constitution building process through the High Level Political Mechanism (HLPM). The mechanism was entrusted with taking the ongoing peace process to a logical conclusion, helping draft the new constitution within the stipulated date and ending the protracted political deadlock. However, it has failed to achieve even the minimum goal and objective of the HLPM. The causes behind its failure were technical difficulties in poor coordination and disputable correlation among insider and outsider forces of government and parliament/constitution assembly. So, a redesign and correction of past mistakes could be a valuable asset to address the existing problem. The top political leaders, especially the chief of the major largest parties may be represented in the restructured upcoming HLPM. However, they must build a SMART Comprehensive Political Accord (CPA) before constituting the new HLPM. In addition, all respective parties and stakeholders must agree to enforce the aforementioned three point agreement without any condition and delay, which are crucial to accelerating peace and the constitution building process in Nepal.

Of course, there should be a clear provision in both the constitution and distribution of cabinet portfolios based on expertise and practical capabilities of a particular representing person. The prime minister, defense minister, finance minister, home minister, foreign ministry and peace minister must be from different parties and they should obey all the suggestions, advice and instruction that are given by the decision of HLPM, which is perhaps a basic prerequisite in transition for an efficient common consensual government. There should be also be a clear consensus on representational issues. Diversity and gender issues also must be addressed in upcoming HLPM as well as in government structure.

Naturally, the largest party should get a chance to be prime minister first; afterwards the rest will come and get places respectively in accordance with their size and strength. If possible, the upcoming government should minimize the number of parliamentarians in cabinet. It is always good to have different representatives in different state wings (legislative, executive and judiciary) which make sense while taking into practical consideration the theory of "power separation and balance." These tools can also force the legislative and executive bodies to be more specific and concentrated in their assigned tasks and responsibilities.

Therefore, the contemporary scenario of Nepal wants a consensual government, not a Majority Party government which has already proved to be a failure to meet both the present and future needs of Nepal, so political parties must be able to provide the broader roadmap for upcoming multiparty national consensus government within the assigned deadline. Also, the nation requires two different high level powerful political apparatus under the command of HLPM who can work until successful achievement of sustainable peace and constitution in Nepal.

Government, as well existing parliaments, should also think and address the necessary dilemmas of DDR, SSR and RRR. The peace process and constitution writing responsibilities cannot be achieved successfully until management of armies and arms comes to its logical end with common consensus and cooperation.

Eventually, the issue of consensual government has become a principal need for Nepal, but it seems almost impossible due to the hoggishness and infighting of political leaders and parties. So, all stakeholders must use their position with all accessible and concerned parties and its leader to come up with a consensual government--which is what the people want after all.

Reintegration of Former Combatants

Ministry of Labour Needs To Be Involved in Reintegration of Former Combatants

By Krishna Hari Pushkar

The reintegration issue of ex-Maoist combatants has become one of the most confrontational issues of the ongoing Nepal peace process.

The ongoing Nepalese Peace Process (PP) has been virtually shelved. The basic deadline for constitution building has been ended with no result. The Peace Process is simply being destroyed due to the consensual derivatives between the Maoists and Nepal Government on reintegration issues.

Both parties have agreed to integrate the former Maoist guerrillas into the Nepalese security system but have always been undecided about the number of guerrillas. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is supposed to provide technical support in the peace process; however the role of UNMIN has not been very useful in this regard.

Surprisingly, the Internal and external stakeholders of the Nepalese Peace Process have remained silent on the turmoil. For this reason, the bilateral-multilateral confrontation on reintegration affairs has become one of the major hurdles in achieving sustainable peace through an agreed-upon comprehensive peace accord.

Both parties are sticking to the stance to forcefully push the ex-combatants into security forces ignoring the choice, voice and rights of the ex-Maoist guerrillas. Despite the huge scope, and the role and sources of the ministry, it is being completely undermined by so called peace leaders and their teams handling the issues.

According to the Government of Nepal's Work Division Regulation 2064, the Ministry of Labour and Transport Management has important and relevant responsibilities that include internal and external labour and employment affairs, social safety nets and security, vocational trainings, HRD/man power development and etc. Thus the assigned responsibilities and authority of the Ministry could be incredibly helpful to manage or reintegrate thousands of intended people or ex-Maoist combatants through direct/indirect, internal and external mechanisms of the ministry.

Frankly, the ministry is quite able to provide opportunities for internal and external employment, skill oriented vocational trainings, and many other courses and opportunities for reintegration and rehabilitation of former guerrillas.

Although, the role and potential resources of the Ministry has been forgotten while discussing the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-combatants; it has been never been discussed or put forward by the Ministry itself/ the government nor by the Maoist party.

According to a survey report, the majority of cantonment-based Maoist guerrillas are considering their choices to go for other alternatives rather to enter into army. Also, both parties have realized that accommodating all (approximately 19,000) former guerrillas in the army is not possible, they all are still insisting and only sticking with employing them in the army sector.

It is not just a matter of realization of facts but also beyond the national need and capacity. It has been also observed that there are hundreds of ex-Maoist combatants who are not eligible (old, children, disabled, ill-sick etc.) to meet the minimum eligibility and condition to enter in national security system, so again, there are good alternatives to assigning the job to the labour ministry.

The top brass of government, ruling political parties, Maoists, and the technical committee, have all stopped moving forward on reintegration issues--including the previously constituted high-level political mechanism (HLPM).

Still dismissing the truth, both conflicting parties are digging ways either to integrate them into the army or in other national security systems leaving the other better options of rehabilitation and reintegration through the Ministry of Labour.

In accordance with eligibility and the rights, voices and choices of the former Maoist Guerrillas, the Ministry may create many options and modules of reintegration and rehabilitation, such as:

A. Choices to go in foreign employment in more than one hundred thirty destinations, under more than two hundred varieties of technical and non technical jobs.

B. Choices to settle into domestic employment. The ministry can easily help to develop preferential employment packages for the ex-combatants by developing strategic policy, programs and functional coordination of industrialists, private sector and trade union institutions.

C. The Ministry has capabilities to provide skill based short-term and long-term vocational trainings on a need basis that may help ex-combatants, whether they choose domestic and international jobs or prefer self-employment.

D. The ministry has enriched funding capabilities for pre to post employment phases and can introduce chain welfare investments for the potential candidates among the ex-combatant Maoist guerrillas.

E. In addition, the ministry have many contingency possibilities to rehabilitate ex-Maoist combatants through social safety net programs and also could include them into jobs such as in the transport management sector. However the government as well other related stakeholders must be careful to consider the integrated community-based reintegration approach rather than the ex-combatant based targeted approach of reintegration. The worlds experience has proved that most DDR programs have failed because the community and relevant stakeholders were ignored in pre to post phases of the entire process.

Therefore, the Ministry could be a principle means to deal and resolve the ongoing dilemmas of the peace process on the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-Maoist combatants since it has a strong, and broader nationwide network and many collaborations with the respective community as well as to the stakeholders. Sometimes, it is judicious to resolve the problem from outside the horizon, especially if the given framework is unable to resolve the problem or adding more and more difficulties in the name of searching for solutions within a limited framework.

Furthermore, it has been observed through a survey report that they will be happier to jump inside the explored options of the Ministry. The illustrated options are financially, technically and legally viable and can also be quickly implemented to address the reintegration and rehabilitation crisis of cantonment-based guerillas, as well as for those deviated combatants who are running in search of socioeconomic reintegration and rehabilitation.

Except for the Maoist party, most of the stakeholders in the peace process want to minimize the number as much as possible of ex-combatants to integrate into the Nepal Army or any other national security system. Because the existing Maoist guerrillas neither meet any professional standard and norms of "State Security" nor is this possible after the merger as international factors and recognition are important for the state security system.

Secondly, Maoist Guerrillas are obvious political extremists, biased and infected with extreme Maoism and prachnadpath, and naturally deviate towards a specific political ideology of its party. Thirdly, similar questions might emerge when another existing insurgent group asks for a similar type of reintegration.

There are more than two dozen other rebellion groups who have also been fighting against the State in various parts of Nepal. It is my observation that the political reintegration model of the Nepalese peace process (accepting Maoists as lawmakers, giving enough places in parliament and directly appointing them into various senior policy level posts in the name of political integration) has become one of the major motivational factors for existing ethno-regional insurgent groups who have started fighting with a hope that they will also get chances to be member of parliaments or some other appointment while they enter in the peace process like the Maoist rebellion.

Of course, the nature and composition of existing insurgent groups are also similar to Maoist guerrillas, and some would say a majority are the splinter groups of Maoists--so what do we do in the future if such things are repeated? Other rebels could also ask for a similar model of political reintegration and also mass entry into the state security system as Maoists are claiming now, so can we really afford it?

Lastly, the existing performances and activities of Maoist guerrillas are still in a rebellious line; they are not even trying to stay in normality nor do they believe in peaceful political democratic philosophy, even after entering in the peace process under the supervision of UNMIN. Therefore it is difficult to stick on a path that pushes entire reintegration with the whole country in chaos.

Therefore, it is clever for all peace process stakeholders to explore the Ministry of Labour and Transport Management as efficient options/alternatives for the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of Ex-Maoist Combatants. This option will bring plenty of benefits including resolving the political deadlock, and will be helpful to drive the entire peace process to its logical end, assisting to harmonize and socialize the ex-combatants in strategic manner.

One of the principle products of the approach is to help and restore the constitution building process in a timely and efficient manner. Additionally, this approach will also minimize the general and technical complexities of reintegration and rehabilitation of cantonment-based guerillas.

Of course, the described way, via the ministry, will increase and add additional value on the success of the ongoing process, and its productivity towards the similar concept and manner of DDR, SSR and RRR (which are crucial and indispensable in a post conflict scenario). Hence, the Ministry must be given the chance for active involvement while dealing with the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-Maoist combatants.

It is a better way to achieve sustainable peace, security and harmony in the country and will mobilize and utilize the existing official sector, resources and approaches of the nation.

Mr. Krishnahari Pushkar writes about social issues, security and conflict management, often in relation to Nepal. An Under Secretary of Government in Nepal, he is well-honored as a Peace, Security and Conflict Management Professional, who contributes regularly to national and international nongovernmental organizations as a peace and conflict management expert.

Source: http://newsblaze.com/story/20100623135945abha.nb/topstory.html

General Strike: End Political Deadlock of Nepal

By Krishna Hari Pushkar

International Labor Day this year was fouled by a crude general strike in Nepal, which was declared by the opposition Maoist Party. In the beginning, it was seen as a peaceful and disciplined movement. However, it is being unexpectedly longer.

Public patience is running out, poor are forced to live without food, sick people are being barred from treatment. People are not allowed to work. The majority have crises to solve with day-to-day, hand-to-mouth problems. Public movement, economic transactions and transportation are in a state of frost. Human rights and fundamental rights have been kyboshed. General life and its activities are totally stopped. Even humanitarian emergency activities are suspended due to the general strike around the nation.

Everything seems out of order. The public's patience has died and seems uncontent to have this general strike. Generally, people have started the war against the strike both inside and outside of the valley. People came on the road to confront Maoist cadres and its supporters. Peace rallies are also being held across the nation in initiation of various professional and commercial organizations.

The direct and indirect confrontational activities are being more & more violent, so the state has ordered curfews to counter possible causalities in various districts. The numbers of equipped security personnel have heightened to riposte the general strike of Maoist.

The fourth, fifth and sixth day of the general strike were dreadful to observe and accounted for lots of incidents of confrontation between Maoist supporters and others in various valleys and cities across the country. Moreover, the government has also decided to use the army for protection of special areas and places in accordance with comprehensive peace accord. In this regards, the representatives of ruling political parties and opposition Maoist leaders have held series of dialogues in luxurious hotels to end the political deadlocks; however results of the efforts were not found until now.

The diplomatic and international community have also put huge pressure and interventional efforts on both government and Maoists. India and China have already expressed and used their open concerns and diplomatic therapy against the ongoing deadly political situation. The UN, US and EU are continuing their special efforts to address the standstill. They are keeping up continuous pressure on both parties to find quick common ground for political consensus. However, these efforts have not yet been effective.

Consequently, the length of the general strike is being increased while at the same time, the state of topsy-turvydom is adding up out of the blue. There are dual interpretations of the ongoing general strike. Maoists explain it is held to achieve the motto of the comprehensive peace accord, to obtain a new constitution within deadlines and to constitute legitimate multi party consensus government under the prime ministership of Maoist leader Mr. Prachanda. The second viewpoint is that the government and its ruling coalition claims that the general strike is unethical, undemocratic and unconstitutional. They contend it is just being held to change the prime minister, and ruling leaders claim the hidden goal of the strike is to just establish Maoist party's' chairman Mr. Puspa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda as prime minister of Nepal, and the party as a major pillar of government.

The ruling party also accuse Maoists of wanting to put the nation into chaos and plotting to boot out the exiting democratic forces from political mainstream. They want to capture overall state functions and functionaries into captivity with muscle, and integrate its former political combatants into state's defense and security mechanism without following the national and international rules and standards.

Furthermore, democratic forces blame Maoists of acting beyond the constitution and rules of law. Government blames the opposition Maoist party as neither respecting the constitutional provisions nor paying honest attention towards the comprehensive peace accord. Hence, the practices and performances of constitutional assembly have become totally defunct and the execution of comprehensive peace accord is paralyzed. Simply stated, currently the overall state affair e.g. constitution assembly, cabinet, peace process etc, are out of whack and jeopardized.

Before beginning, and after enforcement of the ongoing general strikes, there have been series of meetings and dialogues between Maoist parties and representatives of ruling parties to win common ground for political consensus. However, both parties have not yet found any common grounds, which is an opprobrious and clear proof of their incapability. It has openly proved the deficits of the involved politicians.

Maoists believe that power is taken, not given anywhere in the world, so, they will take power and acquire all their demands. Ruling parties say that this viewpoint will only happen in their dreams. The government and its coalition parties won't compromise at all in the legitimate constitutional process.

The road is not a way to remove the prime minister, and the existing prime minister will not resign at all till he is removed through due constitutional process. Hence, the state of differences seems enormous between the parties. It is rib-tickling to imagine both parties sitting to talk and looking for gentle negotiation without compromising their slanted need and demand.

Strategically, the ruling parties have requested Maoists to come through constitutional assembly, if they seek to change the government, rather than general strike or other means that may be painful to people. The Government has also repeatedly requested them to fulfill at least the minimum degree of former commitments before getting the resignation of Prime Minister Mr. Nepal. Minimum commitments include transforming the young communist league (YCL) from paramilitary force to democratic student wings or its desolation, suitable integration and management of ex-Maoist combatants, giving back of seized and captured properties to its true owners without any condition and fully free and transform the Maoist party from militant or paramilitary groups into civil parties. In addition, ruling parties are also asking to stop force donation culture, devastation of parallel government system, stop criminal activities and all activities that are against the norms of democracy and rule of law.

Surprisingly, beside the series of meetings and dialogues there have been no progresses at all. Of course, the Maoists and the government both have plenty of weaknesses, and both parties are not able to honestly enforce the previous commitments and agreed issues in accordance with national need and corresponding political roadmap.

The first series of five dialogues and meetings failed because of the autarchy nature and anarchical characteristics of the confronting parties and its leaders. Both of the parties are putting forward their logic while ignoring the sensitivity of political deadlocks. Both parties are not found serious enough about public and national interests. Neither of the leaders have been able to achieve peace or a constitution in due time.

So, representatives of both teams are not found technically sound. In public eyes, both groups are crazy to capture the cabinet, but they do not foresee the impacts of the ongoing political chaos. Therefore, both parties must rethink and reorganize their representatives, and strategic ways for peaceful dialogue, putting the people and national interest into center-focus. They must come above its political and individual selfishness respecting the mandate of general people's movement, sprit of constitutional assembly and comprehensive peace accord.

Specially, to get true success of peaceful dialogue, the negotiation team must take authorized consent from the respective parties, mentioning clearly about the degree of flexibility along with efficient roadmap, which may able to bring the parties into easy consensus. There are also difficulties and conflict of interest among inter-intra parties and leaders, so, the governments' representatives must participate as valued observers during the pre-ongoing and post dialogue phases to resolve the crisis constructively. Equally, the dialogue team must be inclusive and should incorporate the representation of all parliamentarian forces with new ideas and approaches, otherwise out-dated models and traditional political leaders will not be able to reach a peaceful destination as expected by general public of Nepal.

Both parties must be liberal and compromise in political consensus. Specially, it is important to execute first the previous agreements and commitments duly. Both government and opposition should stop ignoring previous commitments and agreements.

All political parties should practice the philosophy of constitutionalism and rule of law until it works. They must sit together in parliament/ or constitution assembly for necessary dialogues and systematic negotiation. Both parties may also use the system of high-level political mechanism for the purpose. They should also include more, or invite other relevant leading leaders from the respective parties, government and independent personalities from civil society and others necessary groups.

Politicians must understand the needs and interests of the nation and its people, otherwise anarchic and autocratic politicians and parties will gradually collapse as happened in past regimes. Nepalese people want long-lasting freedoms from all types of political confrontation and conflicts. Nepalese are peace-loving people and want to see peace, peace and more peace, so all should stop all types of violence, strikes and political confrontations from their political paths and strategies.

Source

Nepal's Tumbling Peace

Krishna Hari Pushkar

Every successful peace process has its time bound broader strategic norms along with an estimated destination. However, Nepal's peace process has been running in a mysterious rhythm. Neither the government itself nor related stakeholders are found serious, even the estimated destination of ongoing peace process of Nepal is under dubiousness. So, the ongoing peace process seems falling down into limbo. Appallingly, all larger and smaller parties attempt to take leadership of cabinet without caring the cost. There is no more seriousness whether the cost is insurgency or wreck or disposing existing peace process. As well, the diplomatic gravity is also being observed in centripetal pose to hop-on-hop-off the cabinet rather to gearing the peace process. Also, it has largely realized the ailing role of United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and its continuous faulty stratagem has also become one of the most controversial and balking for the path to sustainable peace.

It is seen that all internal and external peace actors are visibly performing against the ethics of peace process and bouncing beyond the edge of comprehensive peace accord. So, how can Nepal's peace process go normally in such situation towards its expected end? Forlornly, it is hapless to describe that no any single direct and indirect actors found sincere and practically committed towards the success of ongoing peace process of Nepal. If the situation continues, it won't be surprising when the moist battalions decide to return jungle or government imposes special op against ethno-political combatants. It is unfortunate that some vested politicians' declares that re-insurgency or re-warfare is held in search of peace, however it has proved blunder to impel for “breach peace for peace”.

Many concerned people self-interact with bunch of FAQs on Nepal's peace process, where they often find less hopes for expected peace while interacting with honest hearts and minds, as people can easily observe the status quo anxious of ongoing peace process. There are very limited professionals involved in Nepal's' peace process. People feel sorry to see even the dishonesty, weakness, passiveness, and regressive attitudes of branded track 1, track 2 and track 3 diplomats. It is because the drawing, design and also involved technician of peace process have proved bluntly sprawled from its required standard. One of the weakest parts of the peace process is to be deficient in essential technical foundation and spares required for maintenance and cog during the motion while implementing the action plan of peace process. Frankly writing, the existing peace process's mechanism is a crowd of vested generalist, while a successful process required more specialists related to the entire areas and issues of respective peace process.

Specially, there are some most crosscutting dimensions of Nepal's peace process including the areas of constitution writing, government and governance system, combatant integration, social inclusion, restructuring of the nation, power share and division, equitable mainstreaming, balance development and particularly the issues related to ethno-regional problems of disadvantages and deprived groups. In addition, the equation gamble of primeministership has become also a like a virus affected dos-mode where most of the politicians and parties do not accept others' leadership to address the issue of peace process. Each of them has a consecutive attitude and believes that his or her supremacy is only the option that could take leadership and deal with the issue properly, which is one of the most untoward parts of the peace process. Unfortunately, no party is ready to accept others headship, whether the peace process collapses or get betrayed.

Ultimately, the general public is a sole victim of tumbling peace process of Nepal. The tumbling peace process can be treated by using various corrective methods. Therefore, all parties must understand that they are in interim transitional phases so, they should establish democratic multi party or multi party consensus government immediately before to take any decision regarding the peace process, if they really want to have true implementation of comprehensive peace accord.

The mutually agreed pluralistic government may helpful to enforce the decisions accordance with the spirit of comprehensive peace accord. Indeed, it will also assistive to move forward the constitution building and parliamentary process in democratic ways. Moreover, Track 1, 2 and 3 parties' requires productive involvement along with civic participation in special technical committees, which should broadly focus on efficient and effective peace process implementation, monitoring and supervision affairs. Nepal is passing through most fragile situation, so the security sector reform and democratization of state and non-state forces need to keep under special priority.

Naturally, general citizens specially the disadvantages and marginalized groups are expecting the honest implementation of social inclusion policy, social justice and mainstreaming policy in entire areas of the nation including political representation, employment and developmental affairs. Now expert illustrate that PLA integration and management is one of the most complex proportions of the peace process, so the justified and legitimated norms need to be developed which can prevent from the possible explode of cantonment based combatants.

Local as well as global pressure and efforts through the diplomatic system requires for maintaining and keeping curb to the peace process within rationale borderline. In addition, Nepal is a democratic country, so the true civil supremacy should be kept in the top priority but the heightening crisis over the peace and tumbling character in the peace process, governance, and government or even in the development works has created a crucial hegemony. Therefore, to prevent from the danger the peace process should be operated by a sustainable system in balance manner, otherwise peace can be breach any time and peace process will remains infinitely in tumbling position. The state and non-state peace pundits should carefully understand that peace has its two core frequencies which are psychological and physical peace assurances that must bring simultaneously to the general public, therefore ongoing faulty Nepal's' peace process must treat clinically to confiscate the crumpling technicalities of filtering peace process.

(Mr. Pushkar is a Peace and Conflict Management Expert and works under the Ministry of Home Affairs/Government of Nepal, Email: khpushkar@gmail.com )

Author's Bio: Mr. Pushkar was a DAAD fellow and studied research master in peace and conflict studies in Germany. In addition, he holds an internationally honored first class master degree in public administration. He has participated in dozens of national and international trainings, seminar, and workshops programs related to governance, migration, ethnicity, social inclusion, human rights, diplomacy, peace, security and conflict management in US, Europe and Asian countries. Mr. Pushkar often writes opinion articles, reports, conduct researches and publish commentary notes on the various contemporary issues related to the areas of his expertise, specially with reference to Nepal. He has been working under the Ministry of Home Affairs/Government of Nepal and well honored as a Peace, Security and Conflict Management Professional. Mr. Pushkar actively involves and also contributes regularly to the dozens of national and international nongovernmental organizations as a capacity of peace and conflict management expert.

Management Issues of Maoist Guerrilla's-PLA in Nepal

Hfgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg / /fhg}lts lvrftfgL

s[i0fxl/ k'is/

Gf]kfndf /x]sf] ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+l3o dfl6{g6f]nLsf] ;dGJfofTds cg'udgdf /x]sf] sl/j aL; xhf/ hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg ;DjlGw /fhg}lts lvrftfgLsf ;fy;fy} s'6g}lts OGb«hfnn] k/fsfi7f g} gfl3;s]sf] 5 . o;n] /fi6«klt lgjf{rgb]lv k|wfgdGqL lgjf{rg ;Ddsf] d'2fdf dfq xf]Og ls dGqfno jfF8kmf8df ;d]t xnf] c8sfof] . oltdfq sxfF xf] /, o;n] ljutsf] ;ftblno ;xdlt, j[xQ zflGt;Demf}tf OTofbLdf klg u|x0f nufof] . kmn:j?k /fHo nfdf] ;do;Dd ;/sf/lxgtfsf] jlGb klg jGg k'Uof]] . b]ze/L c/fhstf, sfg"glxgtf j9\b} /fi6« g} pb08tGqsf] rk]6fdf k/]sf] hf] sf]xLnfO{ ;lhn} cg'ej x'G5 . ctM of] n]v dfkm{t o; ;DjGwdf cawf/0fut?kdf ax'rlr{t æhgd'lQm ;]gf Joj:yfkgÆ sf s]lx kIfx? k|:t't ul/Psf] 5 .

Hfgd'lQm ;]gf sf] x'g <

· Hfgd'lQm ;]gf g]kfn sDo"lgi6 kf6L{ -dfcf]jfbL_n] hgo'4sfndf ;z:q ultljlw ;+rfng ug{ egf{ ul/Psf n8fs' b:tf x'g\ .

· k|r08ky / dfcf]jfbnfO{ sfof{Gjog u/fpgsf nflu ;+ul7t s§/klGy cg'ofoLx?sf] ;Zf:q b:tf x'g\ .

· dfl6{g 6f]nLaf6 6fFrf nufO{ lzlj/x?df /flvPsf]] dfcf]jfbLsf z;:q sfo{stf{x? x'g .

· dfl6{g 6f]nLaf6 cof]Uo 7x/fO{{Psf] jf lzlj/df :j]lR5s jf /0fg}lts ?kdf g/flvPsf] jf jfO{l;Pn h:tf cw{;}lgs ;+/rgfdf /flvPsf] n8fs'x? klg x'g\ .

pk/f]Qm cfwf/x?df hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] kl/efiff ug{ ;lsPklg xfn ;+o"Qm /fi6«;+l3o lgsfo …cgldg’, dfcf]jfbL kf6L{ / cGo /fhg}lts kf6L{x?n] hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] kl/efiff km/s–km/s ?kdf u/]sf] kfOG5 . t/ klg dfl6{g 6f]nLåf/f 6fFrf nufO{ /flvPsf sl/j jL;xhf/ hgd'lQm ;]gfn] /fli6«o / cGt/fli6«o lgsfoaf6 cflwsfl/s ?kdf dfGotf kfPsf] b]lvG5 .

Hfgd'lQm ;]gf sxf 5g <

dfl6{g 6f]nLaf6 6fFrf nufOPsf] Hfgd'lQm ;]gfdWo] w]/} hgf lzlj/x?df /x]sf5g\ eg] s]xL c+u/Ifssf] ?kdf / s]lx :f'/Iffuf8{sf] ?kdf klg /flvPsf5g\ . lagf 6Ffrfjfnf hgd'lQm ;]gfsf xsdf eg] sf]xL jfO{l;Pndf t sf]xL cGo eft[;+u7gdf ;+nUg /xL Jojxfl/s?kdf cw{;}lgs ultljlwx?df ;+nUg ePsf] kfO{G5 . s]xL Hfgd'lQm ;]gf ;ef;b\ ePsf 5g\ eg] s]xL ljleGg :yflgo, If]lqo tyf s]Gb|Lo g]t[Tjdf klg /x]sf5g\ . dfcf]jfbL g]tf e§/fO{n] oL ;j} k|sf/sf ;Demf}tf lakl/tsf s'/fx?nfO{ jGb ug{] k|lta4tf ;+lawfg ;efdf 3f]if0ff ul/;Sg'ePsf] ePtf klg o;sf] sfof{Gjog eg] ;a}sf] z+sfsf] 3]/fdf 5 .

hgd'lQm ;]gfsf ;sf/fTds / gsf/fTds b'j} k|sf/sf ultljlwx? b}lgs rrf{df /x]sf] kfO{G5 . ;do–;dodf hgd'lQm ;]gf slxn] ljsf;lgdf{0f, ;/;kmfO{ tyf z';f;g Joj:yf OTofbLdf tlNng ePsf] ;'lgG5 eg] slxn] xTof, n'6kf6, ckx/0f, u'08fubL{, lj/f]w, rGbf, cfs|d0fdf ;+nUg ePsf] klg ;dfrf/ dfWoddf x]g{ kfO{G5 . csf]{lt/ :j3f]lift?kdf hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] laleGg gfddf ljNnf nufPsf dflg;x?nfO{ ;lhn} hq–tq ljleGg ?kdf e]6\g kfO{G5 . ctM k|d"v r'gf}tL eg]sf] g} hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Jojxfl/s klxrfg ug'{ g} xf] . dfl6{gljNnf ePsfnfO{ ;lhn} lrGg ;lsPklg ;f] jfx]ssfnfO{ s;/L lrGg] <>

s'g hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg h?/L 5 <

l;4fGttxM 6Ffrfjfnf hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkgsf] d'2f ljjfbf:kb / cfjZos 7flgPklg Jojxf/txM ljgf6fFrfjfnf dfcf]jfbL ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg t'ngfTds?kdf cfjZos b]lvG5 . of] d'2f /fi6« / :jo+ dfcf]jfbLsf] nflu klg 7"nf] lrGtfsf] ljifo ePsf] x'g'k5{ . t/ of] n]vsf] laifoa:t'nfO{ 6fFrfjfnfsf] Joj:yfksLo kIfdf dfq s]lGb|t ul/Psf] 5 .

;flRr s} eGg] xf] eg], clxn] of] hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg k|efjsf/L / bIftfk"j{s ul/Pg eg] /fHo l;w} csf]{ vt/gfs o'4df ws]lng ;S5 . g]kfn ;/sf/ / g]=s=kf=dfcf]jfbLlarsf] j[xt zflGt ;Demf}tf, /fli6«o tyf cGt/fli6«o k|of;x? / dfl6{g6f]nLsf] clxn] ;Ddsf] ;j} k|of;x? jfn'jf df kfgL xfn] h:t} xg]5 . ctM ;DjlGwt ;j} /fli6«o tyf cGt/fli6«o lgsfox?sf] ;+o'Qm k|of;df sd;]sd 6fFrfjfnf hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] dfq eP klg k|efjsf/L tyf lb3{sflng Joj:yfkgnfO{ k|fyldstfsf] ljifo agfpg' cfjZos 5 .

dfcf]jfbL ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg ;DjGwL Joj:yf s] 5 <

g]kfn clw/fHosf] cGtl/d ;+ljwfg @)^# tyf lj:t[t zflGt ;Demf}tf @)^# df n]lvPsf] k|fjwfg cg';f/ dfcf]jfbL ;]gfsf n8fs'x?sf] /]vb]v, ;dfof]hg / k'g{:yfkgf ug]{ ;DaGwdf cGtl/d dlGqkl/ifbn] ljz]if sldl6 jgfP/ sfd ug]{ dfq pNn]v ePsf] kfOG5 . hgd'lQm ;]gfnfO{ k|x/L jgfpg] jf /fli6«o ;]gf jf /fHosf] cw{;}lgs jn df ?kfGt/0f ug]{ Joj:yf slx st} s'g} cf}krfl/s b:tfj]hdf ePsf] kfO{b}g . hgd'lTfm ;]gf Joj:yfkgsf] gfddf hgo'4 n8]sf] k'/:sf/ jfkt n8fs'x?nfO{ s'g} Ps k|sf/sf] :yfoL hflu/ k|bfg ug]{ cwf]lift pb]Zo / nIo b]lvP tfklg oL ;]gfx?nfO s;/L sxfF Joj:yfkg ug]{ eGg] af/] ;f] sf] u[xsfo{ slxst} ePsf] xfn;Dd kfOb}g . t/ g]kfn sDo"lgi6 kf6L{ -dfcf]jfbL_n]] pSt b:tfsf] gfd ;]gf /fv]sf] / pgLx?nfO{ hgo"4 sfndf kf6L{sf] ;}lgs ultljlwdf ;z:q hTyfsf] ?kdf k|of]u ul/Psf]n] g]=s=kf= dfcf]jfbLn] pgLx?nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf g} ;dfof]hg ug{' kg]{ hf]/bf/ dfu u/]sf] b]lvG5 eg] dfcf]jfbL afx]ssf /fhg}ltsbnx? / :jo+ g]kfnL ;]gf klg dfcf]jfbLsf] of] wf/0ffsf] k|lt/f]ws b]lvG5 .

hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkgfsf] r"gf}tL tyf ;d:ofx? s] s] x'g <

· dfcf]jfbLn] ldlnh'nL ;/sf/sf] a};fvLdf e/kg{' kg]{ jfWofTds cj:yfdf x'g' .

· dfcf]jfbL jfx]ssf ;j} bn tyf :jo+ ;}lgs tyf k|x/L ;+u7gx? g} ;dfof]]hgsf] k|lt/f]ws x'g' .

· hgd'lQm ;]gf Joj;flos /fli6«o ;]gf geP/ kf6L{ ljz]ifsf] ;]gf x'g' / o;sf] egf{, 5gf}6 tyf sfo{z}nL 5fkfdf/ u'/LNnf df]8]ndf /fhg}lts :jfy{ cg";f/ x'g' .

· cGt/f{li6«o tyf /fli6«o dfkb08x? h:t}M of]Uotf, pd]/, tflnd, kbzf]kfg / ef}lts tyf dfgl;s of]Uotfx? k|rlnt sfg"g tyf dfGotf cg'?k gx'g' .

· ljwdfg ;}lgs jf k|x/L ;+/rgfdf hgd'lQm ;]gf ldnfpbf ;+VofTds ?kdf af]em, k"0f{ cg'Tkfbs / ;+u7gdf k"0f{ cJoj;foLs ;+:s[ltsf] ljsf; x'g] ;Defjgf x'g''' .

· hgd'lQm ;]gf ;dfof]hgsf] d'2f ;Fu} dw]zL nufotsf ;d"bfox?n] ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] nflu ;d"xut hflto egf{ (Mass Recruitment) sf] dfu zzt{ cuf8L ;fg'{ .

· o; k|sf/sf] ;dfoflht ;]gfn] cGt/f{li6«o dfGotf kfpg sl7gfO{ x'g' .

· cfly{sef/sf] r/d l:ylt ;[hgf x'g] ;Defjgf x'g''' .

· cGo w]/} ljb|f]xL ;]gfsf] 6's8Lx?sf] hGd x'g] / jnhkm\tL ;dfof]hgsf] ;+:s[lt sfod x'g;Sg] ;Defjgf x'g''' .

· ;dfof]hg x'g] c+ux?df /x]sf /fi6«;]js / dfcf]jfbLsf hgd'lQm ;]gfx? ljr w«'ljs/0f eO{ åGb ;[hgf x'g' sf ;fy}] plgx?sf] dgf]jndf gs/fTds c;/ kg{;Sg] ;Defjgf x'g''' . .

Hfgd'lQm ;]gfsf] ;kmn Joj:yfkg s;/L ug]{ <

Hfgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg sf] nflu /f]huf/L g} k|d"v pkfo x'g] b]lvG5 . ;j} hgd'lQm ;]gf af:tjd}} k|x/L, ;}lgs jf cw{;}lgs jf s'g} ;'/Iff lgsfodf ;dfof]hg x'g OR5's b]lvb}g / ;a} zfl/l/s ?kdf ;'/Iff ;]jfsf] nflu of]Uo klg 5}gg\ . w]/} h;f]n] lb3{sfnLg /f]huf/L kfpg] xf] eg] ;}lgs jf k|x/L k]zf eGbf cGoq hfg ?rfpg] b]lvG5 . ctM hgd'lQm ;]gf Joj:yfkgsf] nflu b]xfo pkfox? b]lvG5 .

-s_ eO/x]sf] s'g} ;/sf/L ;+u7gx?df laz]if Joj:yf u/L hfuL/ k|bfg ug]{ .

-v_ eO/x]sf] ;+u7gx?df k"0f{ ;djGofTds Ps :jtGq lgsfo u7g u/]/ ;dfof]hg ug{] .

-u_ 5'6} cl:tTjsf] :jtGq ;+u7gsf] :yfkgf u/]/ hfuL/ k|bfg ug{] .

-3_ /f]huf/Lsf P]lR5s ljsNkx? cjnDjg u/fP/ /f]huf/Lsf] Aoj:yf ug{] .

-ª_ dfly pNn]lvt pkfox? dWo] Ps jf Ps eGbf j9L pkfox? cfjZostf cg';f/ cjnDjg ug]{ .

Dffly pNn]lvt pkfox?dWo], Gf]kfn ;/sf/ tyf g]kfn sDo"lgi6 kf6L{ -dfcf]jfbL_n]] hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] Aoj:yfkg ;DjlGw ljz]if Aoj:yf u/L dfly j'Fbf -s_ df pNn]v eP adf]lhd g]kfn k|x/L jf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;+u7gdf l;w} ;dfof]hg ug{] / ljz]if lsl;dsf] kbzf]kfg, sfd, st{Jo, clwsf/, lgo'lQm, j[ltljsfz, cjsfz tyf ;'ljwfsf] ljz]if Aoj:yf tf]s]/ ug{ ;lsG5 . t/ of] Tolt /fd|f] ljsNk gx'g;S5 . of] k|ls|ofsf] nflu w}}/} afwf lj/f]w, sfg"gL c8\rg nufotsf r'gf}tLx? em]Ng' kg{] x'g;S5 .

To:t} j'Fbf -v_ cg';f/ laBdfg g]kfnL ;]gf, g]kfn k|x/L jf z;:q k|x/Lsf] ;+u7gdf 5'§}} jflxgL jf ljefux? u7g u/L ljz]if lhDd]jf/L tf]sL hgd'lQm ;]gfnfO{ ;dfof]hg ug{ ;lsG5 . j'Fbf -u_ df n]lvPadf]lhd ;/sf/ n] 5'§} cw{;}lgs c+u jf ;'xfpbf] k|s[ltsf] ;'/Iff lgsfo h:t}M cf}wf]lus ;'/Iffjn, ;Ldf ;'/Iffjn jf ;z:q lghLuf8{ jnsf] ljsf; u/L ug{ ;Sg]5 . csf]{ dxTjk"0f{ ljsNksf] ?kdf j'Fbf -3_ df elgP h:t} ljBdfg lzlj/x?sf hgd'lQm ;]gfx?nfO{ :j]lR5s /f]huf/Lsf] nflu k|fljlws 1fg, lzk, k"+hL, tflnd tyf cfjZos cfly{sk|fljlws ;xof]u k|bfg u/]/ uf]N8]g xof08;]s u/]/ k7fpg ;lsg]5 . o;sf cltl/Qm O{R5's nfO{ j}b]lzs /f]huf/ tyf zLkd"ns Jofkf/–Joj;fosf] nflu klg df}sf k|bfg u/]/ Joj:yfkg ug{ ;lsG5 .

dfly pNn]lvt kfFrf} df]8]n j'Fbf -ª_ sf ;DaGwdf, hgd'lQm ;]gfsf] OR5f, /fi6«sf] cfjZotf / pgLx?sf] of]Uotf, bIftf / zLksf cfwf/df hgd'lQm ;]gfx?;Fu ;dGjo / 5nkmnu/L ljleGg ;d"xdf 5'6\ofpg] / pko'Qmtfsf] cfwf/df j'Fbf -s_b]lv j'Fbf -3_ ;Ddsf pkfox?df laz]if1tfsf] cfwf/df hgd'lQm ;]gfnfO{ ;dfj]z u/fO{ ;kmn / k|efjsf/L Joj:yfkg ug{ ;lsG5, h"g t'ngfTds ?kdf sd ljjfbf:kb, ldtJooL tyf ;lhn} sfof{Gjog ug{ ;lsg] x'G5 .

pk/f]Qm j'Fbf -s_ b]lv j'Fbf -ª_ ;Dd sf pkfox?dWo] j'Fbf -s_ / -v_ cg';f/sf] dfq Aoj:yfkg cToGt hl6n, ljjfbf:kb tyf r"gf}ltk"0f{ x'g;Sg] b]lvG5 eg] j'Fbf -u_, -3_ / -ª_ sf] pkfox? t'ngfTds?kdf Af9L k|efjsf/L / ;lhn} ;kmntfk"j{s sfof{Gjog ug{ ;lsg] b]lvG5 . cem} eGg' kbf{ j'Fbf -ª_ nfO{ ;a} eGbf pko'Qm pkfo dfgL ;/sf/n] cjnDjg ug{' a9L j'l4dfgL b]lvG5 .

cGTodf, ljwdfg hgd'lQm ;]gf Aoj:yfkg / /fhg}lts lvrftfgL sf] ljifo ca nfdf] ;do;Dd yftL /fVg'sf] ;§f of] d'2f k|fljlwsx?sf] ;Nnfx tyf l;kmfl/; cg';f/ dfly k|:t't ul/Psf pkfox? cjnDjg u/L Joj:yfkg ug{ ;lsof]] eg] lglZrt?kdf ;lhn} Aoj:yfkgsf] ;fy;fy} zflGt k|ls|ofsf] ;kmn cjt/0f x'g;S5 . olb of] d'2f oyfl;w|| ;a} bnx? ldnL ;do d} Aoj:yfkg ul/Pg eg] g]kfnL hgtfnfO{ g]tfx?n] b]lvPsf] gofF g]kfn lgdf{0fsf] ;kgf / cGt/fli6«o lgsfodf zflGt k|ls|ofsf] sf/0fn] sdfPsf] k|lti7f ;j} u'Dg ;S5 / /fHo k"gM 4Gbsf] e"Fd/Ldf km:g ;Sb5 .

-n]Vfs zflGt tyf åGb Joj:yfkg ljifosf] cg';Gwfgstf{ x'g'x'G5 / g]kfn ;/sf/sf] u[x dGqfno;+u cfjå x'g'x'G5 _